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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Quality is a major concern in health care. Recent and ongoing reforms in several coun-
tries to stimulate competition and patient choice among publicly funded hospitals have
highlighted the importance of establishing more knowledge about the relationship between
competition and quality.1 While the present paper is a new attempt to address this gen-
eral topic, we restrict our attention to the case of quality competition between health care
providers facing regulated prices, which is relevant for most European health care systems
as well as the U.S. Medicare and Medicaid programmes.
The introduction of market mechanisms in the health care sector — through a combi-
nation of prospective payment systems and free patient choice — aims at giving health care
providers incentives to attract more patients (and thus payments) by oﬀering a higher
quality of care. Indeed, the existing theoretical literature on quality competition with
regulated prices is practically unanimous in reporting a positive relationship between com-
petition — measured either as a switch from monopoly to (imperfect) competition or as a
marginal increase in the intensity of competition — and quality. In a general setting, this
conclusion is reached in, e.g., Ma and Burgess (1993), Wolinsky (1997), Brekke, Nuscheler
and Straume (2006) and Matsumura and Matsushima (2007), while, in a more speciﬁc
health care setting, the same conclusion is reached in, e.g., Calem and Rizzo (1995), Grav-
elle (1999), Lyon (1999), Gravelle and Masiero (2000), Beitia (2003), Nuscheler (2003),
Brekke, Nuscheler and Straume (2007) and Karlsson (2007).
However, the empirical evidence, though relatively scarce, seems to be considerably
more ambiguous. For example, while Kessler and McClellan (2000) and Tay (2003) ﬁnd
ap o s i t i v ee ﬀect of competition on quality in the health care sector (with ﬁxed prices),
Gowrinsankaran and Town (2003) ﬁnd a negative eﬀect, Shen (2003) ﬁnds mixed eﬀects,
and Shortell and Hughes (1988) and Mukamel, Zwanziger and Tomaszewski (2001) ﬁnd
1Examples include the UK, where hospitals are paid a tariﬀ for every patients treated (Payment by
Results) and patients have been given a free choice of hospital. Similar reforms have been introduced in
Norway, Denmark, Italy and several other European countries.
2no eﬀects.2,3
In this paper we extend and generalise the received theoretical literature in several
directions by simultaneously including (i) heterogeneous patients and elastic total demand
for health care, (ii) semi-altruistic health care providers, and (iii) general cost functions
that are non-separable in activity and quality. We analyse, ﬁrst, the eﬀect of a policy
regime switch from monopoly to competition (i.e., introducing free patient choice). Second,
we study the eﬀect of increasing competition either through lower transportation costs (i.e.,
increasing the degree of substitutability among hospitals) or by increasing the number of
hospitals. In our choice of theoretical framework — a Salop model with symmetrically
distributed health care providers — we follow the existing theoretical literature, where
quality competition is typically analysed within a spatial competition framework.
Our key contribution is to model health care providers as being semi-altruistic. While
this is a quite common assumption in the general literature on health care supply, it has
seldom been applied in a context of competition between health care providers.4 Indeed,
t h ep r e s e n tp a p e ri s—t ot h eb e s to fo u rk n o w l e d g e—t h eﬁrst attempt to incorporate
altruistic behaviour when studying the relationship between competition and quality.5
Our analysis shows that this assumption potentially makes a huge diﬀerence. Whether we
consider the introduction of competition or an increase in the degree of competition, we
show that the relationship between competition and quality is generally ambiguous and
depends crucially on hospital cost structure and the degree of altruism. More speciﬁcally,
2See Gaynor (2006) for a survey of theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship between
hospital competition and quality.
3There are also several empirical studies analysing the relationship between competition and quality —
ﬁnding mixed results — when prices are set by the hospitals. See, e.g., Dranove and Satterthwaite (1992),
Dranove, Shanley and Simon (1992), Ho and Hamilton (2000), Sari (2002) and Propper, Burgess and
Green (2004). The case of quality competition with endogenous prices is not addressed in the present
paper. Besides, it is well known that the relationship between competition and quality is theoretically
more ambiguous in this particular case.
4Hirth (1999) and Harrison and Lybecker (2005) introduce non-proﬁto b j e c t i v e si nas e t t i n go fc o m p e -
tition between health care providers. However, since competition is analysed in a setting of ﬂexible prices
and the relationship between competition and quality is not an issue in either paper, these studies are
quite diﬀerent from ours. A more general analysis of competition in non-proﬁt versus for-proﬁt industries
is found in Lakdawalla and Philipson (2006).
5Ellis (1998) also models competition between semi-altruistic health care providers. However, he does
not address the relationship between competition and quality but focuses instead on the eﬀect of diﬀerent
reimbursement schemes on providers’ incentives for over- versus under-provision of services to diﬀerent
types of patients.
3as u ﬃcient degree of altruism may, for certain hospital cost structures, lead to a negative
relationship between competition and equilibrium quality.
Comparing monopoly and competition, a negative relationship between competition
and quality is more likely to occur (for a given degree of altruism) if the number of patients
who make choices between diﬀerent hospitals — what we dub the "competitive demand
segment" — is suﬃciently large relative to the number of patients who do not make such
choices. The key mechanism that contributes to this reversal result is that semi-altruistic
behaviour may lead to negative marginal proﬁts in equilibrium.6 Due to mechanisms that
will be described in detail in subsequent sections, this implies that competition has an a
priori ambiguous eﬀect on hospital quality incentives.
We also show that intensiﬁed competition measured by reduced transportation costs
may lead to lower equilibrium quality even if health care providers are pure proﬁt maximis-
ers, implying positive marginal proﬁts in equilibrium. Though apparently counterintuitive
and in contrast with previous literature — the result is due to strict convexity and non-
separability in the cost function — we can show that this particular result depends on the
presence of a non-competitive demand segment and is essentially a demand eﬀect, rather
than a pure competition eﬀect.
Finally, we show that quality incentives are generally ambiguous also with respect
to the perhaps most usual competition measure, namely the number of hospitals in the
market. This result crucially hinges on the degree of altruism. In the absence of altruism, a
higher hospital density will always lead to higher quality. However, if the degree of altruism
is suﬃciently high relative to the degree of cost convexity (and/or cost substitutability
between quantity and quality), the eﬀect of more hospitals is in fact reversed. The intuition
is related to the fact that, when the number of hospitals increases, each hospital faces a
lower demand, which results in fewer treated patients and lower marginal patient beneﬁt
of quality investments at hospital level.
The main structure of our model — which is presented in the next section — is based
6We ensure of course that the (semi-altruistic) hospitals earn non-negative proﬁts in equilibrium,
although their marginal proﬁts might be negative. With strictly convex production costs, negative marginal
proﬁts do not imply that overall proﬁts are negative in equilibrium.
4on Brekke, Siciliani and Straume (2008). In that paper, we analyse the eﬀect of hospital
competition on waiting times, rather than quality. While there are clear parallels between
waiting times and more general quality of care — as the former can be interpreted as a
negative form of hospital quality — there are also important diﬀerences. While increasing
quality is costly for the provider, reducing waiting times is not. More precisely, while
increasing quality has a direct and an indirect cost for the provider, reducing waiting times
only has an indirect cost, through a higher demand. Thus, the results in Brekke, Siciliani
and Straume (2008) do not automatically carry over to the case of quality competition.
For example, while a higher hospital density unambiguously reduces waiting times, the
eﬀect on hospital quality is ambiguous. More generally, while the degree of altruism does
not generally aﬀect the relationship between competition and waiting times, it plays a
crucial role in explaining the relationship between competition and quality, as we will
show below.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we present the model. In
Section 3, we derive equilibrium quality under, respectively, local monopoly and compe-
tition, and analyse which regime that provides more incentives for quality provision. In
Section 4, we consider a regime of free patient choice (competition) and investigate the
impact of intensiﬁed competition, both in terms of lower transportation costs and a higher
number of hospitals. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2M o d e l
Consider a market for elective hospital treatment where n hospitals are equidistantly
located on a circle with circumference equal to 1. There are two patient types — L(ow)
and H(igh) —d i ﬀering with respect to the gross valuation of treatment. Both types are
uniformly distributed on the circle with density normalised to 1. A patient demands either
one treatment from the most preferred hospital, or no treatment at all. The utility of a
patient of type s ∈ {L,H}, who is located at x and being treated at hospital i, located at





V − t|x − zi| + kqi if s = H
v − t|x − zi| + kqi if s = L
, (1)
where qi ≥ q is the quality at hospital i, k is a parameter measuring the (marginal) utility
of quality, t is a transportation cost parameter, and V − v>0 measures the diﬀerence in
the gross valuation of treatment between the two types.7,8 The lower bound q on hospital
quality represents the minimum treatment quality hospitals are allowed to oﬀer, implying
that q<qcan be interpreted as malpractice. For simplicity, we set q =0 .M o r e o v e r ,
we normalise the marginal utility of quality to one, i.e., k =1 , without loss of generality.
This implies that t can be interpreted as the marginal disutility of travelling relative to
quality. Thus, a low (high) t means that quality is of relatively more (less) importance to
the patient than travelling distance.9
The H-segment constitutes a share λ of the total number of patients, which is nor-
malised to 1. We focus on equilibria where the H-segment is fully covered, while the
L-segment is only partly covered, i.e., some L-patients will not seek treatment in equilib-
rium.10 The former assumption means that there is competition (or scope for competition)
in the market, while the latter assumption implies that total demand for hospital treatment
is elastic with respect to quality.11 We will intermittently refer to the L-a n dH-segments
7Diﬀerences in gross valuations across patients can be due to diﬀerences in age, gender, illness severity,
or simply opportunity costs. For example, old patients with a non-severe condition might have a low
valuation of medical treatment.
8Transportation costs can be given a broad interpretation to include all costs (disutility) associated
with being far from "home" to receive treatment. There is also strong empirical evidence showing that
distance is a major predictor of patients’ choice of hospital, see, e.g., Kessler and McClellan (2000) and
Tay (2003).
9An alternative non-physical interpretation of the horizontal dimension is a disease space, where the
location of a patient is associated with the disease she suﬀers from, and the hospitals are diﬀerentiated
with respect to the disease they are best able to cure, reﬂecting hospital specialisation or "service mix"
(see, e.g., Calem and Rizzo, 1995, and Brekke, Nuscheler and Straume, 2007).
10This essentially requires that the diﬀerence in gross valuation of treatment is suﬃciently large between
the two patient types.
11Notice that, by focusing on the equilibrium with a fully covered H-segment and a partly covered
L-segment, we are able to cover the other possibility — full market coverage in both demand segments — as
a special case. By setting λ =1 , the model is reduced to a standard model with only one demand segment
(where total demand is inelastic), but this is qualitatively equivalent to the case of two demand segments
where both are fully covered in equilibrium.
6as the monopoly and competitive demand segments, respectively.
Hospitals are prospectively ﬁnanced by a third-party payer oﬀering a per-treatment
price p and potentially a lump-sum transfer T. The objective function of hospital i is
assumed to be given by
πi (qi,q−i)=T + pXi (qi,q−i)+αBi (qi,q−i) − C (Xi (qi,q−i),q i), (2)
where Xi (qi,q−i) is demand for treatment at hospital i (derived from individual utility
maximisation) and q−i represents the vector of qualities at neighbouring hospitals. The
cost of supplying hospital treatments is given by the cost function C (Xi,q i),w i t hCX > 0,
Cq > 0, CXX ≥ 0 and Cqq > 0.12 We also assume CXq ≥ 0, i.e., quality and quantity are
(weakly) substitutes: an increase in quality is more costly when more patients are treated.
The function Bi (·) represents the total beneﬁt of the patients receiving treatment at
hospital i, while the parameter α ∈ [0,1] captures the degree of altruism of the provider.13
We assume that hospitals cannot turn down patients seeking treatment, implying that we
do not allow for explicit rationing.
The hospitals simultaneously and independently choose qualities, in order to maximise
their objective functions. Maximising (2) with respect to qi and applying symmetry, the
equilibrium quality, q∗,i sg i v e nb y 14,15
∂Xi (q∗)
∂qi
[p − CX (Xi (q∗),q∗)] + α
∂Bi (q∗)
∂qi
= Cq (Xi (q∗),q∗),i =1 ,2, (3)
where ∂Xi/∂qi > 0 and ∂Bi/∂qi > 0.
12A convex variable cost function is supported by evidence suggesting that economies of scale are quite
rapidly exhausted in the hospital sector (see, e.g., Ferguson et al., 1999, and Folland et al., 2004, for
literature surveys).
13This formulation is consistent with, e.g., Ellis and McGuire (1986), Chalkley and Malcolmson (1998)
and Jack (2005). Notice also that it is general, since the special case of a proﬁt-maximising hospital can
be recovered by setting α =0 .
14This equilibrium is characterised by a fully covered H-segment and a partially covered L-segment if
t
2n ∈ (v + q
∗,V + q
∗).
15Notice that the interior equilibrium implicitly relies on the assumption that a limited liability con-
straint is not binding, i.e.,
T + pX (q
∗) − C (X (q
∗),q
∗) ≥ 0.
7The marginal beneﬁt from quality is given by the higher revenues and the non-monetary
beneﬁt arising from altruism. The marginal cost of quality includes the direct marginal
cost of quality investments and the increased marginal cost of treatment that arises from
the demand increase. The combination of altruistic preferences and increasing marginal
treatment costs makes the sign of marginal proﬁts, p − CX, ambiguous in equilibrium.16
More speciﬁcally, marginal proﬁts are negative in equilibrium if the marginal altruistic
gain of a quality increase is larger than the direct marginal cost: α(∂Bi/∂qi) >C q.17
3 Competition or monopoly?
Consider two distinctly diﬀerent policy regimes: 1) a benchmark case of no competition,
where patients are assigned to hospitals purely according to geographical distance and
hospitals are in eﬀect local monopolies; 2) competition, where patients are free to choose
among hospitals when demanding treatment.18 T h ec h o i c eo fp o l i c yr e g i m ea ﬀects the
demand responsiveness to quality, ∂Xi/∂qi, which, in turn, aﬀects the marginal altruistic
utility gain, ∂Bi/∂qi. From (3) we see that these are the two channels through which
competition might aﬀect quality.
3.1 Monopoly
Without free patient choice, hospital i’s demand from the H-segment is exogenously given
by XH
i =1 /n.I n t h e L-segment, the patient who is indiﬀerent between treatment at
hospital i and no treatment is located at xL
i ,g i v e nb yv−txL
i +qi =0 , or, more explicitly,
xL
i =( v + qi)/t. Total demand for hospital i from the L-segment is given by XL
i =2 xL
i .
16Notice that, by marginal proﬁts we refer here (and throughout the paper) to the change in proﬁts due
to a marginal increase in production, not quality.
17Notice that, with strictly convex production costs, negative marginal proﬁts do not imply that proﬁts
are negative in equilibrium.
18General Practioners (GPs) are often involved in the choice of hospital, especially in gatekeeping
systems. A GP is an expert and might recommend a hospital to the patient based on quality (and
distance); see Brekke, Nuscheler and Straume (2007). It is not crucial for the analysis whether it is the
GP or the patient that makes the choice of hospital.




























= Xi (qi) > 0. (7)
Notice that lower transportation costs makes it less costly for patients to demand
treatment; this increases demand responsiveness from L-type patients to hospital quality
changes. Regarding (7), notice that a quality increase at hospital i has, in general, two
eﬀects on total utility for patients treated at the hospital: ﬁrst, it increases utility for all
patients that are already treated at the hospital; second, it increases demand for hospital
i treatment. Since, in the absence of competition, the demand increase only comes from
the L-segment, the utility contribution is zero at the margin. Thus, there is a positive
utility contribution only from inframarginal patients.
Equilibrium quality under monopoly, q∗ = qm, is then found by substituting (4)-(7)
into (3).19
3.2 Competition
With free patient choice, the hospitals’ quality choices aﬀect demand also in the H-
segment. Since the distance between hospitals is equal to 1/n,t h eH-patient who is
indiﬀerent between seeking treatment at hospital i and hospital j is located at xH
i ,g i v e n







t +2 CXq − α

2(1−λ)
t − Cqq < 0,
which holds if the cost function is suﬃc i e n t l yc o n v e xi nq u a l i t y .
9by V − txH





+ qj, or, more explicitly, xH
i =
¡




Assuming that quality is the same at both neighbouring hospitals20,a n dg i v e nb yqj, total
demand for hospital i from the H-segment is given by XH
i =2 xH
i .D e m a n d f r o m t h e
L-segment is the same as before. Total demand facing hospital i from both segments is
thus given by
Xi (qi,q j)=λXH
i +( 1− λ)XL
i =






while the surplus to patients treated at hospital i is given by
































Comparing (6) and (10), we see that the demand responsiveness to quality changes
is higher under competition than under monopoly. The reason is simply that, under
competition, there is a demand response also in the H- s e g m e n t :a ni n c r e a s ei nt h eq u a l i t y
oﬀered by hospital i will not only induce more L-types to seek treatment, it will also
attract H-types who would otherwise have sought treatment at a neighbouring hospital.
Comparing (7) and (11), we also see that the increase in total patient utility from a
marginal increase in quality at hospital i is higher under competition than under monopoly.
The reason is that, with competition, a quality increase leads to an inﬂow of patients (from
the competitive segment) with a strictly positive net utility of hospital treatment. In other
words, there is a utility contribution from both marginal and inframarginal patients. Intu-
20Since the model is symmetric, notice that, when solving for the Nash equilibrium, we can deﬁne Xi
and Bi for qi−1 = qi+1 = qj,m a x i m i s eπi with respect to qi a n dt h e ns e tqi = qj to derive the quality level
in the symmetric equilibrium.
10itively, the diﬀerence between (7) and (11) depends on the relative size of the competitive
segment, given by λ.
Equilibrium quality under competition, q∗ = qc, is found by substituting (8)-(11) into
(3) and setting qi = qj = qc.21
3.3 Competition versus monopoly
A comparison of the two policy regimes with respect to equilibrium quality yields the
following result:
Proposition 1 Competition between hospitals lead to higher (lower) quality in equilibrium
if the competitive segment (λ)i sb e l o w( a b o v e )at h r e s h o l dl e v e lb λ,g i v e nb y











Proof. Combining the two equilibrium conditions (under monopoly and competition,
respectively) yields, after some manipulations,
2
α




[Cq (Xi (qm),qm) − Cq (Xi (qc),qc)]
= −
λ
(1 − λ)(2− λ)
∙







We need ﬁrst to conﬁrm monotonicity of the left-hand side (LHS) of the above equation
































< 0,w h i c hi s





















By applying the second-order conditions we conﬁrm that ∂(LHS)/∂qc < 0 and ∂(LHS)/∂qm >
0.S i n c e LHS =0if qc = qm, it follows that qc > (<)qm if the right-hand side of the












Consider ﬁrst the benchmark case of pure proﬁt-maximising behaviour. From (12) we
see that α → 0 implies b λ →∞ . Thus, without altruism, competition leads to higher
equilibrium quality for all λ ∈ (0,1), as expected.
In the presence of altruism, however, the eﬀect of competition on quality is a result of
two counteracting forces. On the one hand, competition increases the marginal altruistic
gain of quality (cf. (7) and (11)), since hospitals can attract high-beneﬁtp a t i e n t sb y
increasing quality. Ceteris paribus, this leads to higher hospital quality in equilibrium.
On the other hand, competition increases the demand responsiveness to quality (cf. (6)
and (10)). Whether or not the latter eﬀect increases quality incentives depends on the
sign of the marginal proﬁts, p − CX, in the monopoly equilibrium. If marginal proﬁts
are positive, hospitals will compete more ﬁercely to attract patients also for purely proﬁt-
oriented reasons, and competition will unambiguously increase quality.
However, if the marginal proﬁts are negative — which requires a certain degree of
altruism — a more quality-responsive demand implies, ceteris paribus, that hospitals have
less incentives to invest in quality, since the marginal patient is ﬁnancially unproﬁtable
to treat. If this is the case, then the introduction of competition has an ambiguous
eﬀect on equilibrium quality, and competition will lead to lower quality if the (ﬁnancial)
incentive to avoid unproﬁtable patients is stronger than the (altruistic) incentive to attract
12high-beneﬁt patients. In general, the former incentive tends to dominate — establishing a
negative relationship between competition and quality — if marginal proﬁts are suﬃciently
negative in the monopoly equilibrium. This tends to be the case if the degree altruism is
high and hospital density is low, relative to the direct marginal cost of quality.22
As the above analysis shows, α>0 is a necessary but not suﬃcient condition for a
negative relationship between competition and quality. However, it should be stressed
that our way of modeling of altruism is a somewhat extreme case among the plausible
alternatives. We have assumed that decision makers have semi-altruistic preferences only
towards patients treated at their own hospital. The other extreme case would be to assume
that decision makers at each hospital care equally much about all patients in the market,
regardless of where they are treated. In this case, the marginal altruistic gain of quality
would be the same under monopoly and competition.23 This would eliminate the incentive
to attract high-beneﬁt patients for altruistic reasons, implying that, if marginal proﬁts
are negative in the monopoly equilibrium, competition would always reduce equilibrium
quality. Thus, the condition given in Proposition 1 should be seen as a lower bound
on the likelihood that semi-altruistic behaviour leads to a negative relationship between
competition and quality.
4 Intensity of competition
In this section we consider a competition regime with free patient choice and analyse
whether or not intensiﬁed competition will lead to higher quality. We measure intensiﬁed
competition in two ways: ﬁrst, we study the impact of lower transportation costs (i.e.,
increased substitutability); second, we analyse the impact of more hospitals in the market.
22Notice that e λ>(<)1if Cq > (<)
α
n, i.e., if the direct marginal cost of quality is larger (smaller) than
the marginal altruistic gain in the monopoly equilibrium, implying positive (negative) marginal proﬁts.
23In both cases, ∂B/∂qi = Xi.
134.1 Transportation costs (substitutability)
Consider the eﬀect of increasing the degree of competition in the market through lower
transportation costs, i.e., increasing the substitutability among the hospitals in the market,
which is a standard competition measure in the previously cited literature.24
In our framework, lower transportation costs have two diﬀerent eﬀects: it makes
demand more responsive to quality changes and it increases total demand from the L-
segment. Totally diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst-order conditions in the competition regime, and












t2 (p − CX)+αλ




t CXX + CXq − α
¢ 2(1−λ)
t − αλ




where ∂X/∂t = −2(1− λ)(qc + v)/t2. The second-order condition ensures that the de-
nominator is positive, so the sign of the expression is determined by the sign of the nu-
merator.
Consider ﬁrst, as a benchmark, the standard case of pure proﬁt-maximising behaviour
(α =0 ) and inelastic total demand (λ =1 ). Since λ =1eliminates the demand eﬀect
(∂X/∂t =0 ), the numerator reduces to −(2 − λ)(p − CX)/t2.S i n c eα =0ensures that
p>C X in equilibrium, this expression in unambiguously negative. Thus, we recover the
standard result from the literature that lower transportation costs increase quality.
In the more general case of α ∈ (0,1) and λ ∈ (0,1), results are more ambiguous. The
ﬁrst term in the numerator is always positive (since ∂X/∂t < 0). Using the ﬁrst-order
condition, we can show that the second term is also positive if αλ/2n>C q (·), i.e., if
altruism is suﬃciently high relative to the direct marginal cost of quality investments.25
In this case, ∂qc/∂t > 0, implying that increased competition unambiguously reduces
24Notice that t can, to some extent, be thought of as a policy variable. For example, in Norway patients’
travelling costs are partially reimbursed by the public payer. In many countries, there is also an increased
(policy-induced) availability of performance indicators on quality which facilitates comparison across health
care providers. Although this is mainly related to informational issues, which are not explicitly modelled
in the present paper, Brekke, Nuscheler and Straume (2006) have shown, in a similar model, that increased
patient information is qualitatively equivalent to reduced transportation costs.
25Notice that this condition implies negative marginal proﬁts, since
2−λ
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14quality. Notice that this result — that lower transportation costs reduce quality if the
degree of altruism is suﬃciently high — holds qualitatively also for the special case of
λ =1 , and the intuition for the result closely mirrors the intuition given for Proposition
1.
On the other hand, if marginal proﬁts are positive and suﬃciently large, we obtain
the standard result from the literature, that more competition increases quality. Notice,
however, that positive marginal proﬁts is not as u ﬃcient condition for increased compe-
tition to increase quality. Furthermore, even without altruism, it is not necessarily the
case that lower transportation costs increase quality. By setting α =0in (13) we still
obtain ∂q∗/∂t ≷ 0, in contrast to the received literature. This is due to our assumptions
of increasing marginal activity costs and non-separability in the cost function. It is impor-
tant to stress, though, that this is a demand eﬀect rather than a competition eﬀect. If we
eliminate the demand eﬀect by setting λ =1 , the ambiguity of the relationship between t
and q∗ only survives for α>0.
We summarise the above analysis and discussion as follows:
Proposition 2 (i) Lower transportation costs have in general an indeterminate eﬀect
on quality, even if marginal proﬁts are positive in equilibrium, and even if the degree of
altruism is zero;
(ii) Lower transportation costs always reduce quality if the degree of altruism is large
relative to the direct marginal cost of quality;
(iii) If marginal proﬁts are positive in equilibrium, the marginal cost of treatment is
constant and the cost function is separable in quality and activity, then lower transportation
c o s t sa l w a y si n c r e a s eq u a l i t y .
4.2 The number of hospitals (density)
The perhaps most direct and obvious competition variable is the number of hospitals. In
our framework there is local competition. This means that a higher number of hospitals
will increase the density of hospitals in the market. The eﬀect of more hospitals might seem
15obvious in the sense that we would expect hospitals to compete more ﬁercely for patients.
Thus, we would expect that quality increases as more hospitals enter the market. As we
will see, the relationship between hospital density and quality is not so obvious.
The impact of a higher number of hospitals on equilibrium quality is obtained by
totally diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst-order conditions in the competition regime, and applying














t CXX + CXq − α
¢ 2(1−λ)
t − αλ




where ∂Xi/∂n = −λ/n2. The second-order condition ensures that the denominator is
positive, so the sign of the expression is determined by the sign of the numerator.
Proposition 3 A higher number of hospitals leads to lower (higher) quality in equilibrium
if the degree of altruism is above (below) a threshold level b α,g i v e nb y








In order to explain the intuition behind this result, let us once more start by considering
the benchmark case of pure proﬁt-maximising behaviour. If α =0 , the numerator in (14)
is unambiguously positive, implying that more hospitals always lead to higher quality, as
long as CXX and/or CXq are strictly positive. Higher hospital density means that each
hospital faces lower demand and thus performs fewer treatments. If hospital costs are
s t r i c t l yc o n v e xi no u t p u t ,l o w e rdemand increases marginal proﬁts (p − CX), making it
more proﬁtable for each hospital to attract extra patients by increasing quality. Cost
substitutability between quantity and quality (CXq > 0)a m p l i ﬁes this eﬀect.
However, with semi-altruistic providers, a counteracting eﬀect is introduced. When
fewer patients are treated at each hospital, the marginal patient beneﬁt of higher quality
is correspondingly reduced (see (11)). All else equal, this gives each hospital weaker incen-
tives to increase quality for altruistic reasons. If the degree of altruism is suﬃciently high
relative to the degree of production cost convexity and/or cost substitutability between
16quantity and quality, the counteracting eﬀect dominates and a higher number of hospitals
results in lower quality. For example, in the case of constant marginal cost of production
and cost independence between quantity and quality, which are standard assumptions in
the cited literature, we see from (15) that the threshold level of altruism reduces to b α =0 ,
implying that there is always a negative relationship between the number of hospitals and
equilibrium quality with semi-altruistic providers.
Finally, observe that, although the eﬀects of higher hospital density are related to
changes in individual hospital demand, the presence of a competitive segment is crucial
for the results. If there is no competitive segment (λ =0 ), then a higher number of
hospitals has no eﬀect on quality incentives.
5 Concluding remarks
With semi-altruistic health care providers and a general convex cost structure, a positive
relationship between hospital competition and quality is no longer guaranteed. Therefore,
our model — which extends and generalises the existing theoretical literature — is useful to
clarify under which conditions we might expect competition to increase (resp., decrease)
quality.
Our key contribution is to carry the assumption of semi-altruistic health care providers
over to a context of quality competition. There are several features that are thought to
distinguish the market for health care from markets for other consumption goods. One
important distinguishing feature is semi-altruistic provider preferences, an assumption
that is reasonably common in the literature on health care supply but rarely used in other
contexts. What we have shown in this paper is that this particular assumption can lead to
counterintuitive and perhaps unexpected eﬀects of competition. Besides oﬀe r i n gap o s s i b l e
explanation for the mixed empirical evidence on the eﬀect of competition on quality, there
is also a potential lesson to be learned for policy makers as well as analysts of health care
markets: if we believe that there are some important features that distinguish health care
markets from other markets, such as altruistic provider preferences, we should also be
17careful about carrying standard intuition about product market competition — that more
competition leads to higher quality — over to markets for health care.
By way of conclusion, we would also like to emphasise that even if policy measures to
increase competition among health care providers do not lead to the expected result —
higher quality of health care — it does not automatically follow that such policy measures
should not be undertaken. However, an analysis of the desirability of such policies would
require a full-ﬂedged welfare analysis, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
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